Introduction
In the later 1970s, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine contained in the U.S. Army had nonetheless to emerge from the frustration and frustration of the Vietnam War. Thus it was that in 1980 Colonel Paul Vallely 1 , Commander of the seventh PSYOP Group, requested me, as his Headquarters PSYOP Research & Analysis (FA) Team Leader, to draft a paper which will encourage some futurethought contained within the PSYOP group.
He didn’t desire a Vietnam postmortem, nonetheless significantly some present and progressive concepts relating to PSYOP’s evolution and software program program. I ready an preliminary draft, which Colonel Vallely reviewed and annotated, which resulted in revised drafts and critiques till he was glad, and the consequence of that was this paper: From PSYOP to MindWar: The Psychology of Victory.
Colonel Vallely despatched copies of it to fairly a couple of governmental workplaces, companies, instructions, and publications concerned or fascinated by PSYOP. He supposed it not as an article for publication, nonetheless merely as a “talking paper” to stimulate dialogue. In this it was fairly worthwhile, judging by the in depth and full of life letters he obtained relating to it over the next a amount of months.
That ought to have been the tip of MindWar: a minor “staff study” which had accomplished its modest job. With the arising of the Internet contained in the 1980s, nonetheless, MindWar obtained a very sudden – and considerably comedian – resurrection. Allusions to it steadily proliferated, with its “sinister” title shortly worthwhile it mainly primarily essentially the most lurid, conspiracy-principle popularity. The rumor mill shortly had it reworked into an Orwellian blueprint for Manchurian Candidate concepts administration and world domination. My personal picture as an occult persona added gasoline to the wildfire: MindWar was now touted by the lunatic fringe as conclusive proof that the Pentagon was awash in Black Magic and Devil-worship.
Now that this absurdly comedian opera has in any case considerably subsided, I believed that it might presumably be fascinating to make a whole and correct copy of the paper accessible, along with an Introduction and a few historic-hindsight annotations to place it in moderately priced context. After all it did – and maybe nonetheless does – have one issue worthwhile to say. Within the U.S. navy, PSYOP has habitually been relegated to a as soon as extra-seat as a “force multiplier”. The principal strategic picks are made in consideration of commonplace political and navy pursuits and targets.
Only then is PSYOP invited to the desk, to assist get maintain of already-agreed-upon missions additional efficiently. MindWar reverses this sequence. Psychological means for reaching victory – principally by means of convincing the enemy that he really desires to carry his nationwide insurance coverage protection insurance coverage insurance policies into concord with ours – are prolonged-established in help of primary political targets. The use of “ordinary” navy vitality (bombs, bullets, and so forth.) is taken under consideration a “last resort” in circumstances whereby MindWar by itself fails. 1 Later Major General, USAR.
2 The time interval “MindWar” was coined by one totally different PSYOP officer, Colonel Richard Sutter, and myself in 1977. After seeing the latest movie Star Wars, we carried out with a modification of its title as a futuristic totally different for the considerably bland Army designation “Psychological Operations”. An avowedly science-fictional treatment of MindWar, full with a caricature of Sutter at its helm, seems in my Star Wars story The Dark Side, accessible at www.xeper.org/maquino
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The revenue of Mind War is that it conducts wars in nonlethal, noninjurious, and nondestructive methods. Essentially you overwhelm your enemy with argument. You seize administration of all of the means by which his authorities and populace course of data to make up their minds, and as well as you modify it in order that these minds are made up as you want. Everyone is glad, nobody will get damage or killed, and nothing is destroyed. Ordinary warfare, alternatively, is characterised by its lack of motive. The antagonists merely maim or kill one another’s of us, and steal or destroy one another’s land, till one facet is damage so badly that it offers up [or both sides are hurt so badly that they agree to stop short of victory]. After such a warfare there’s lasting distress, hate, and struggling.
The solely loser in MindWar are the warfare profiteers: corporations and firms which develop fats on orders for helicopters, tanks, weapons, munitions, and so forth. Consequently what President Dwight Eisenhower referred to in consequence of the “military/industrial complex” is probably counted upon to resist implementation of MindWar in consequence of the governing strategic battle doctrine. That’s the MindWar prospectus in its most simplified form.
While contained in the 1980s I had no motive to suppose that this paper had had any official impression upon U.S. PSYOP doctrine inside or earlier the Army, it was with some fascination that I noticed specific of its prescriptions utilized by manner of the first Gulf War, and easily lately far more clearly by manner of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In each circumstances excessive PSYOP was directed each in opposition to the issue of the assault and upon U.S. dwelling public notion and opinion, in 2003 to the extent of “embedding” journalists with navy fashions to inevitably channel their views and perceptions.
The impact of even these minor strategies of MindWar was wonderful. A psychological native local weather of inexorable U.S. victory was created and sustained in each the United States and Iraq, which accelerated that victory on the underside.
Somewhat so much a lot much less positively, the failure of MindWar on this occasion to be guided by solely mainly primarily essentially the most rigorous ideas of actuality and ethics has merely as inexorably led to a considerable post- victory evaporation of that euphoric native local weather. Therein lies the Achilles’ heel of MindWar. Invoking in consequence of it does mainly primarily essentially the most intense feelings and commitments of its audiences, it ought to ship the merchandise as they’re judged by the target audiences. If the moral values of these audiences are sometimes not revered – if MindWar is used solely contained in the service of ulterior motives and targets – the next “disintoxication”is probably socially shattering.
In 1987 I wrote an additional in depth analysis paper for the National Defense University relating to the ethics of PSYOP. Particularly if MindWar is actually to be employed as a function of U.S. worldwide safety, I am unable to stress too strongly the necessity for its subordination to the strictest and most enlightened ideas of humanity as talked about in that paper. Psychological Operations: The Ethical Dimension.
Now let’s attempt the 1980 MindWar paper itself. In addition to its real footnotes (which usually arrange quote-sources), I’ve added a pair of new ones to spotlight/critique some of its themes. These new footnotes are acknowledged by “[MA2003]” at their starting.
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LTC John Alexander’s Military Review article in help of “psychotronics” – intelligence and operational employment of ESP – was decidedly provocative. Criticism of analysis on this home, based mostly as a result of it is on current frontiers of scientific regulation, brings to concepts the laughter that greeted the Italian scientist Spallanzani in 1794 when he urged that bats navigate at nighttime means of what we now title sonar. “If they see with their ears, then do they hear with their eyes?” went the joke, nonetheless I consider that the U.S. Navy is glad any particular person took the thought critically ample to pursue it.
Psychotronic analysis is in its infancy, nonetheless the U.S. Army already possesses an operational weapons methods designed to do what LTC Alexander would really like ESP to do – as well as to that this weapons system makes use of current communications media. It seeks to map the minds of impartial and enemy people after which to change them in accordance with U.S. nationwide pursuits. It does this on an enormous scale, embracing navy fashions, areas, nations, and blocs. In its current form it’s referred to as Psychological Operations (PS YOP).
Does PSYOP work, or is it a merely a magnificence with which house commanders would significantly not be bothered? Had the query been requested in 1970, the reply would have been that PSYOP works very efficiently really. In 1967 and 1968 alone, an entire of 29,276 armed Viet Cong/NVA (the equal of 95 enemy infantry battalions) surrendered to ARVN or MACV forces beneath the Chieu Hoi amnesty program – the foremost PSYOP effort contained in the Vietnam War. At the time MACV estimated that the elimination of that very same quantity of troops in battle would of price us 6,000 ineffective.
On the opposite hand, we misplaced the warfare – not consequently of we now have been out-fought, nonetheless consequently of we now have been out-PSYOPed. Our nationwide will to victory was attacked additional effectively than we attacked that of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and notion of this actuality impressed the enemy to dangle on till the United States lastly broke and ran for residence.
So our PSYOP failed. It failed not consequently of its ideas have been unsound, nonetheless significantly consequently of it was outmatched by the PSYOP of the enemy. The Army’s efforts preferred some spectacular successes, nonetheless our personal PSYOP didn’t really change the minds of the enemy populace, nor did it defend the U.S. populace at residence in opposition to the propaganda of the enemy. Furthermore the enemy’s PSYOP was so sturdy that it – not larger armies or bigger weapons – overcame all of the Cobras and Spooky s and ACAVs and B52s we fielded. The lesson shouldn’t be to ignore our personal PSYOP efficiency, nonetheless significantly to change it and strengthen it in order that it would really do exactly that sort of subject to our enemy inside the next warfare.Better {{{hardware}}} is good, nonetheless by itself it is going to change nothing if we don’t win the warfare for the concepts.
The very very very first thing it will be significant to overcome is a view of PSYOP that limits it to routine, predictable, over-apparent, and subsequently marginally atmosphere pleasant “leaflet and loudspeaker” capabilities. Battlefield gadgets of this kind have their place, nonetheless it desires to be that of a accent to the primary effort. That essential effort cannot start on the company or division diploma; it ought to originate on the nationwide diploma. It ought to strengthen our nationwide will to victory 3 Alexander, Lieutenant Colonel John B., “The New Mental Battlefield: Beam me up, Spock” in Military Review, Vol LX, No. 12 December 1980.
4 [MA2003] Alexander (later Colonel) was concerned with “parapsychological” concepts and experiments such as ESP and “remote viewing”. These haven’t any connection irrespective of with every commonplace PSYOP or MindWar. Cf. my paper Project Star Gate: $20 Million up in Smoke [and Mirrors] at www .xeper.org/maquino . 5 ” Chieu Hoi: The Winning Ticket”. MACV Command Information Pamphlet 6-69, March 1969.
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and it ought to assault and finally destroy that of our enemy. It each causes and is affected by bodily battle, nonetheless it’s a kind of warfare which is fought on a far more delicate foundation as efficiently – contained in the minds of the nationwide populations concerned. So allow us to start with a simple title change. We shall rid ourselves of the self- aware, virtually “embarrassed” thought of “psychological operations”. In its place we shall create Mind War. The time interval is harsh and concern-inspiring, and so it desires to be: It is a time interval of assault and victory – not one of the rationalization and coaxing and conciliation.
The enemy can be offended by it; that’s fairly all appropriate so long as he’s defeated by it. A definition is obtainable: MindWar is the deliberate, aggressive convincing of all folks in a warfare that we’re going to win that warfare. It is deliberate in that it’s deliberate, systematic, and full effort involving all ranges of prepare from the strategic to the tactical. It is aggressive consequently of opinions and attitudes wants to be actively modified from these antagonistic to us to these supportive of us if we’re to get maintain of victory.
We won’t win if we content material materials supplies ourselves with countering opinions and attitudes instilled by enemy governments. We ought to attain the mother and father prior to they resolve to help their armies, and we should always at all times attain these armies prior to our battle troops ever see them on battlefields. Compare this definition with that of psychological warfare as first provided by General William Donovan of the OSS in his World War II-interval “Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare”:
Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, together with ethical and bodily, by which the tip is attained – aside from these of acknowledged navy operations, nonetheless together with the psychological exploitation of the consequence of these acknowledged navy actions – which have a tendency to destroy the necessity of the enemy to get maintain of victory and to damage his political or financial performance to receive this; which have a tendency to deprive the enemy of the help, help, or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to stop his acquisition of such help, help, or sympathy; or which have a tendency to create, protect, or improve the necessity to victory of our personal of us and allies and to purchase, protect, or to improve the help, help, and sympathy of neutrals. 6
If the euphemism “psychological operations” resulted from, as one frequent officer put it in a 1917 letter, “a great need for a synonym which would be used in peacetime that would not shock the sensibilities of a citizen of democracy”, then it might need succeeded domestically. 7 On the opposite hand it doesn’t appear to have reassured the sensibilities of the Soviets, who in 1980 described the U.S. Army PSYOP as together with: … unpardonable strategies of ideological sabotage together with not merely blackmail, provocation, and terror. 8
6 Roosevelt, Kermit (Ed.) War Report of the OSS. New York: Walker and Company, 1976, Volume I, web net web page 99. 7 Letter, Major General W.C. Wyman to Major General Lauris Norsted, 22 July 1947, quoted to Paddock, Colonel Alfred H., “Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a ‘Special Warfare’ Capability for the United States Army”. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 8 Belashchenko, T., ‘”Black Propaganda’ from Fort Bragg” in Sovetskiy Voin. Moscow, June 1980, pages 46-47.
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The reluctance with which the Army has accepted even an “antiseptic” PSYOP half is efficiently-documented in Colonel Alfred Paddock’ s good treatise on the historic earlier of PSYOP institution. Again and as quickly as further efforts to forge this weapon into its most atmosphere pleasant configuration have been irritated by leaders who couldn’t or mustn’t see that wars are fought and bought or misplaced not on battlefields nonetheless contained in the minds of males. As Colonel Paddock so aptly concludes: In an exact sense, the best way during which all through which psychological and unconventional warfare developed from 1941 till their union as an accurate Army efficiency in 1952 suggests a theme that runs all by manner of the historic earlier of specific warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army trying to address ideas and organizations of an unconventional nature. 9
According to the current doctrine, PSYOP is taken into account an adjunct to the primary effort of worthwhile battles and wars; the time interval often used is “force multiplier”. It is really not thought of a precondition to command picks. Thus PSYOP cannot predetermine the political or psychological effectiveness of a given navy motion. It can solely be used to stage that motion in the very best colours as a result of it is taken. MindWar can’t be so relegated. It is, really, the tactic to which tactical warfare ought to conform whether or not or not it is to get maintain of most effectiveness.
The MindWar state of affairs wants to be preeminent contained in the concepts of the commander and wishes to be the principal consider his each house various. Otherwise he sacrifices measures which really contribute to worthwhile the warfare to measures of quick, tangible satisfaction. [Consider the rational for “body counts” in Vietnam.]
Accordingly PSYOP “combat support” fashions as we now know them ought to develop to be a subject of the sooner. MindWar groups ought to current technical experience to the commander from the onset of the planning course of, and in the slightest degree ranges down to that of the battalion. Such groups can’t be composed – as they’re now – of division-immaterial officers and NCOs who know merely the fundamentals of tactical propaganda operations. They wants to be composed of full-time specialists who attempt to translate the tactic of nationwide MindWar into tactical targets maximize the atmosphere pleasant worthwhile of the warfare and cut back loss of life. Such MindWar groups will win commanders respect provided that they could ship on their ensures. 10
What the Army now considers to be the perfect PSYOP – tactical PSYOP – is really mainly primarily essentially the most restricted and primitive effort, due to the difficulties of formulating and delivering messages beneath battlefield constraints. Such efforts ought to proceed, nonetheless they’re precisely seen as reinforcement of the primary MindWar effort. If we don’t assault the enemy’s will till he reaches the battlefield, his nation might have strengthened it as greatest it can. We ought to assault which can prior to it’s thus locked in place. We ought to instill in it a predisposition to inevitable defeat.
Strategic MindWar ought to start the second warfare is taken into account to be inevitable. It ought to get your hands on the eye of the enemy nation by means of each accessible medium, and it ought to strike on the nation’s potential troopers prior to they positioned on their uniforms. It is of their properties and their communities that they’re most susceptible to MindWar. Was the United States defeated contained in the jungles of Vietnam, or was it defeated contained in the streets of American cities?
9 Paddock, op. cit., web net web page 258. 10 [MA2003] In 1980 neither PSYOP nor Special Forces have been occupation branches contained in the Army. Rather they have been “branch-immaterial”, which signifies that assignments to them have been comparatively transient and on the extended-time interval menace of promotion inside one’s primary division. Later SF would develop to be each an officer and an enlisted division, and PSYOP would receive an enlisted division, nonetheless PSYOP doesn’t nonetheless have an officer occupation division.
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To this finish MindWar wants to be strategic in emphasis, with tactical capabilities having enjoyable with a reinforcing, supplementary function. In its strategic context, MindWar ought to attain out to mates, enemies, and neutrals alike all by means of the globe – neither by means of primitive “battlefield” leaflets and loudspeakers of PSYOP nor by means of the weak, imprecise, and slim effort of psychotronics 11 – nonetheless by means of the media possessed by the United States which have the capabilities to attain virtually all of us on the face of the Earth.
These media are, of course, the digital media – tv and radio. State of the artwork work developments in satellite tv for pc television for laptop tv for laptop computer communication, video recording strategies, and laser and optical transmission of broadcasts make potential a penetration of the minds of the world resembling would have been inconceivable just some years up to now. Like the sword Excalibur, we have nonetheless to attain out and seize this machine; and it would really rework the world for us if we have now the braveness and the integrity to improve civilization with it. If we don’t settle for Excalibur, then we relinquish our expertise to encourage worldwide cultures with our morality. If they then want moralities unsatisfactory to us, we have now no selection nonetheless to wrestle them on an additional brutish diploma.
MindWar ought to goal all folks whether or not or not it is to be atmosphere pleasant. It should not solely weaken the enemy; it ought to strengthen the United States. It strengthens the United States by denying enemy propaganda entry to our of us, and by explaining and emphasizing to our of us the rationale for our nationwide curiosity in a specific warfare.
Under current United States regulation, PSYOP fashions might not goal American residents. 12 That prohibition depends upon the presumption that “propaganda” is definitely a lie or at least a deceptive half-actuality, and that the federal authorities has no appropriate to lie to the mother and father. The Propaganda Ministry of Goebbels should not be a element of the American technique of life.
Quite appropriate, and so it wants to be axiomatic of MindWar that it regularly speaks the actual fact. Its energy lies in its expertise to focus recipients’ consideration on the actual fact of the long run as efficiently as that of the current. MindWar thus entails the acknowledged promise of the truth that the United States has resolved to make exact if it isn’t already so.
MindWar shouldn’t be new. Nations’ most interesting – and least costly – victories have resulted from it, each in time of precise battle and in time of threatened battle. Consider the atomic assaults on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bodily destruction of these two cities didn’t destroy Japan’s expertise to proceed stopping. Rather the psychological shock of the weapons destroyed what remained of Japan’s nationwide will to wrestle. Surrender adopted; a protracted and costly floor invasion was averted. 13
MindWar’ s effectiveness is a perform of its personal skillful use of communications media, nonetheless no bigger error might very properly be made than to confuse MindWar with merely a greater and additional unprincipled propaganda effort. “Propaganda” as outlined by Harold Lasswell, is: 11 [MA2003] “Psychotronics” was a time interval utilized to ideas resembling ESP and “remote viewing” by some authorities companies contained in the 1970s-80s, perhaps to make them sound additional “scientific”.
12 [MA2003] This regulation was established after World War II, purportedly each out of distaste for the acute dwelling propaganda of the fascist powers and since of misgivings about American dwelling propaganda, notably all by means of World War I. At the time of this paper (1980), the regulation was so strict that, for event, printing presses of Army PSYOP fashions have been prohibited from getting used to run off posters for native navy recruiting stations. 13 [MA2003] Nevertheless Hiroshima and Nagasaki are sometimes not wonderful examples of MindWar, consequently of – regardless of their psychological impact – they concerned the killing and injuring of an obligatory many individuals. MindWar is nice when nobody is bodily harmed.
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… the expression of opinions or actions carried out intentionally by people or teams with a view to impact the opinions or actions of completely totally different people or teams for predetermined ends and thru psychological manipulations. 14 Propaganda, when it’s acknowledged as such – and one factor produced by a “PSYOP” unit is so acknowledged – is routinely assumed to be a lie or in any case a distortion of the actuality. Therefore it really works solely to the extent {{{that a}}} militarily-pressed enemy is prepared to do what we want him to. It doesn’t work consequently of we have now glad him to see the actual fact as we see it.
If his “Conclusions” chapter to the Army’s exhaustive 1976 case-evaluation of PSYOP strategies, L. John Martin affirms this coldly and bluntly: What this all boils down to is that if our persuasive communication finally ends up with an in depth to constructive impression, we should always at all times attribute it to luck, not science… The effectiveness of propaganda might be even so much a lot much less predictable and controllable than the effectiveness of mere persuasive communication. 15 Correspondingly propagandists are assumed to be liars and hypocrites, prepared to paint one factor collaborating colours to dupe the gullible. As Jacques Ellul places it:
The propagandist shouldn’t be, and can’t be, a “believer”. Moreover he cannot take into consideration contained in the ideology he ought to use in his propaganda. He is merely a person on the service of a celebration, a state, or one different group, and his course of is to insure the effectivity of that group … If the propagandist has any political conviction he ought to put it apart so as to uncover a way to use some widespread mass ideology. He cannot even share that ideology, for he ought to use it as an object and manipulate it with out the respect that he would have for it if he believed in it. He shortly acquires contempt for these widespread pictures and beliefs… 16
Unlike PSYOP, MindWar has nothing to do with deception and even with “selected” – and due to this fact deceptive – actuality. Rather it states an entire actuality that, if it doesn’t now exist, shall be pressured into existence by the necessity of the United States. The examples of Kennedy’s ultimatum to Khrushchev by manner of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hitler’s stance at Munich might presumably be cited. A MindWar message doesn’t have to match situations of summary credibility as do PSYOP themes; its present makes it credible. As Livy as rapidly as talked about:
The terror of the Roman title shall be such that the world shall know that, as rapidly as a Roman navy has laid siege to a metropolis, nothing will change it – not the pains or winter nor the weariness of months and years – that it is aware of no finish nonetheless victory and is prepared, if a swift and sudden stroke won’t serve, to defend till that victory is achieved. 17
Unlike Ellul’ s cynical propagandist, the MindWar operative ought to know that he speaks the actual fact, and he wants to be personally devoted to it. What he says is solely a element of MindWar; the remaining – and the take a look at of its effectiveness – lies contained in the conviction he duties to his (14) Lasswell, Harold D. in Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda: The Formation of Men ‘s Attitudes. New York: Random House, 1965, pages xi-xii.
15 Martin, L. John, “Effectiveness of International Propaganda” in Department of the Army Pamphlet 525- 7-2 The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Volume Two.
Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1976, web net web page 1020. 16 Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Random House, 1965, pages 196-197. 17 Keller, Werner, The Etruscans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, web net web page 262.
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viewers, contained in the rapport he establishes with it. And that is nothing that could possibly be merely faked, if really it could possibly be faked in the slightest degree. “Rapport”, which the Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms defines as “unconstrained relations of mutual confidence”, approaches the subliminal; some researchers have urged that it’s itself a unconscious and even maybe even ESP-based mostly “accent” to an overt commerce of data.
Why does one take into consideration one tv newsman bigger than one totally different, though each might report the an equivalent headlines? The reply is that there’s rapport inside the previous case; and it’s a rapport which has been acknowledged and cultivated by mainly primarily essentially the most worthwhile broadcasters.
We have lined the assertion of inevitable actuality and the conviction behind that assertion; these are qualities of the MindWar operative himself. The recipient of the assertion will choose such messages not solely by his aware understanding of them, nonetheless furthermore by the psychological situations beneath which he receives them. The principle behind “brainwashing” was that bodily torture and deprivation would weaken the concepts’s resistance to suggestion, and this was true to a stage. But in the long term brainwashing doesn’t work, consequently of clever minds later uncover their suggestibility beneath such situations and due to this fact low worth impressions and picks inculcated accordingly. 18
For the concepts to take into consideration in its personal picks, it ought to really actually really feel that it made these picks with out coercion. Coercive measures utilized by the operative, consequently, should not be detectable by unusual means. There is not any want to resort to concepts-weakening treatment resembling these explored by the CIA; really the publicity of a single such technique would do unacceptable damage to MindWar’ s popularity for actuality.
Existing PSYOP identifies purely-sociological elements which counsel related idioms for messages. Doctrine on this home could also be very developed, and the accountability is principally one of assembling and sustaining people and groups with ample experience and expertise to apply the doctrine effectively. This, nonetheless, is solely the sociological dimension of goal receptiveness measures. There are some purely pure situations beneath which minds might develop to be kind of receptive to concepts, and MindWar ought to take full revenue of such Cf. John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate” . New York: Times Books, 1979.
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phenomena as atmospheric electromagnetic prepare 19 , air ionization 20 , and intensely low frequency waves 21 .
At the muse of any various to institute Mind War contained in the U.S. security institution is a pretty simple query: Do we want to win the next warfare all through which we select to develop to be concerned, and might we want to receive this with minimal loss of human life, at minimal expense, and contained in the least quantity of time? If the reply is for certain, then MindWar is a necessity. If we want to commerce that sort of victory for additional American lives, financial catastrophe, and negotiated stalemates, then MindWar is inappropriate, and if used superficially will really contribute to our defeat. In MindWar there’s not another option to victory. 22
19 Atmospheric electromagnetic (EM) prepare: The Human physique communicates internally by EM and electrochemical impulses. The EM house displayed in Kirlian footage, the effectiveness of acupuncture, and the physique’s bodily responses to fairly a couple of varieties of EM radiation (X-rays, infrared radiation, seen gentle spectra, and so forth.) are all examples of human sensitivity to EM forces and fields. Atmospheric EM prepare is repeatedly altered by such phenomena as sunspot eruptions and gravitational stresses which distort the Earth’s magnetic house. Under quite a few exterior EM situations, people are kind of disposed to the consideration of new concepts. MindWar desires to be timed accordingly. Per Dr. LJ. Ravitz:
Electromagnetic house constructs add gasoline to the concept unifying residing matter harmoniously with the operations of nature, the expression of an electromagnetic house no so much a lot much less than non-residing methods; and that as components on spectrums, these two entities might in the long run take their positions contained in the group of the universe in a manner each explicable and rational … A tenable principle has been provided for emergence of the nervous system, rising not from purposeful requires, nonetheless as a substitute deriving in consequence of of this of dynamic forces imposed on cell teams by all of the house sample. Living matter on has a definition of state based totally completely on relativity house physics, by means of which it has been potential to detect a measurable property of full state choices. (Ravitz, State- Function, Including Hypnotic States” in Journal of American Society of Psychosomatic Dentistry and Medicine, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1970.)
20 Ionization of the air: An abundance of unfavourable condensation nuclei (“air ions”) in ingested air enhances alertness and exhilaration, whereas an extra of constructive ions enhances drowsiness and despair. Calculation of the ionic steadiness of a viewers’s atmospheric setting shall be correspondingly helpful. Again this could possibly be a naturally-occurring state of affairs – attributable to such quite a few brokers as image voltaic ultraviolet gentle, lightning, and shortly-transferring water – significantly than one which most be artificially created. (Detonation of nuclear weapons, nonetheless, will alter atmospheric ionization ranges.) Cf. Soyke, Fred and Edmonds, Alan, The Ion Effect. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977.
21 Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) waves: ELF waves up to 100 Hz are as rapidly as additional naturally occurring, nonetheless they could even be produced artificially (resembling for the Navy’s Project Sanguine for submarine communication). ELF-waves are sometimes not typically seen by the unaided senses, nonetheless their resonant impression upon the human physique has been linked to each physiological factors and emotional distortion. Infrasound vibration (up to 20 Hz) can subliminally impact ideas prepare to align itself to delta, theta, alpha, or beta wave patterns, inclining an viewers in route of every half from alertness to passivity. Infrasound might very properly be used tactically, as ELF-waves endure for superb distances; and it might very properly be used along with media broadcasts as efficiently. See Playfair, Guy L. and Hill, Scott, The Cycles of Heaven. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978, pages 130-140.
22 [MA2003] After General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur’s properly-recognized aphorism: “In war there is no substitute for victory.”